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Abstract: Moral concerns are socio-intuitive processes comprising individual and collective aspects modulated by social cognition. 
In this sense, the objective of this study was to investigate the relationship among self-consciousness, empathy, and individualizing 
(IMC) and binding moral concerns (BMC). Therefore, outlined a quantitative study in which 341 Brazilian adults (63% female) 
answered the instruments: Self-Reflection and Insight Scale, Empathy Scale, Moral Self-Concept Scale, and Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire. Data were submitted to a multiple linear regression analysis. The results indicated a positive association among IMC, 
moral self-concept, empathic concern and personal distress. Regarding BMC, self-reflection and perspective-taking presented negative 
association, as moral self-conception and empathic concern were associated positively. It is concluded that affective components of 
empathy and moral self-concept are good predictors of moral concerns and that high-order metacognitive processes are not predictors 
of IMC, but negative predictors of BMC.
Keywords: self-perception, empathy, self-concept, morality, social cognition
Autopercepção, Empatia e Autoconceito Moral Predizem Preocupações Morais 
em Adultos
Resumo: Preocupações morais são processos socio-intuitivos que compreendem aspectos individuais e coletivos modulados pela 
cognição social. Neste sentido, o objetivo deste estudo foi verificar as relações entre autoconsciência, empatia e preocupações morais 
individualizantes (PMI) e vinculativas (PMV). Para tanto, delineou-se um estudo quantitativo, no qual 341 adultos brasileiros (63% 
mulheres), responderam à Escala de Autorreflexão e Insight, Escala de Empatia, Escala de Autoconceito Moral e Questionário de 
Fundamentos Morais. Os dados foram submetidos à análise de regressão linear múltipla. Os resultados indicaram uma associação 
positiva entre as PMI e as variáveis autoconceito moral, preocupação empática e angústia pessoal. Em relação às PMV, autorreflexão 
e tomada de perspectiva associaram-se negativamente, enquanto autoconceito moral e consideração empática associaram-se 
positivamente. Conclui-se que componentes afetivos da empatia e autoconceito moral são bons preditores de preocupações morais e 
que processos metacognitivos de alta-ordem não são preditores de PMI, mas preditores negativos de PMV.
Palavras-chave: autopercepção, empatia, autoconceito, moral, cognição social
Autopercepción, Empatía y Autoimagen Moral Predicen Preocupaciones 
Morales en Adultos
Resumen: Preocupaciones morales son procesos socio-intuitiva que incluyen aspectos individuales y colectivos modulados por 
la cognición social. En este sentido, el objetivo de este estudio fue investigar la relación entre la auto-conciencia, la empatía y las 
preocupaciones morales individualizantes (PMI) y vinculantes (PMV). Por lo tanto, se desarrolló un estudio cuantitativo en el que 341 
adultos brasileños (63% mujeres), respondieron a Escalas de Auto-reflexión y Insight, de Empatía, de Autoimagen Moral y Cuestionario 
de Fundamentos Morales. Los datos fueron sometidos a análisis de regresión lineal múltiple. Los resultados indicaron una asociación 
positiva entre las variables autoimagen moral, preocupación empática y angustia personal y PMI. En cuanto a PMV, la auto-reflexión y 
la toma de perspectiva se asociaron negativamente, como autoimagen moral y preocupación empática se asociaron positivamente. Se 
concluye que los componentes afectivos de la empatía y autoimagen moral son buenos predictores de las preocupaciones morales y que 
los procesos metacognitivos de orden superior no son predictores de PMI, pero predictores negativos de PMV.
Palabras clave: autopercepción, empatía, autoimagen, moral, cognición social
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Human social nature can be defined as the human ability 
to share world views and self-views and to accumulate norms 
and beliefs (Barrett, Henzi, & Lusseau, 2012). The manner 
in which an individual cares about relationships established 
with others and with the groups to which they belong (Haidt, 
2007) composes what is called moral concerns. These 
are socially shared values that include principles such as 
fairness, reciprocity, authority, in group (social belonging), 
and purity that are found in all human cultures (Graham 
et al., 2011). Although universal, these principles have 
different degrees of importance for different cultures. In this 
sense, moral concerns can be defined as automatic, socio-
intuitive processes modulated by culture, experienced in 
the form of feelings of approval or disapproval in the face 
of any situation with moral content. They emerge from a 
sophisticated processing of social information (Haidt & 
Joseph, 2008), centered by a brain that is highly specialized 
in social interactions (C. D. Frith, 2007).
Studies on moral concerns show that there has been a 
significant shift in thinking in relation to the influence reason 
exerts on moral judgment, whereby moral reason has ceased 
to be viewed as a judgment, the triggering factor occupying a 
subsequent facultative stage. According to moral foundations 
theory (Graham et al., 2011), rationalization serves to justify 
intuitive feelings triggered automatically in the face of a 
moral context in which one’s own well-being or the well-
being of others may be affected. For the authors, although 
human beings are motivated first and foremost by self-
interested, they also care about how they and others treat 
people and how they participate in groups (Haidt, 2007).
According to previous studies of the Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011), the hierarchical 
model of moral concerns suggests the existence of a 
distinctive dimension and one connective dimension. Both 
are considered to be significantly influenced by culture, 
possibly due to the human need to belong and for affiliation. 
In the distinctive dimension individual moral concerns 
(IMC) emphasize issues predominantly related to harm and 
fairness, that is, aspects related to fairness and the protection 
of rights. Binding moral concerns (BMC), in turn emphasize 
connective issues related to authority, a sense of social 
belonging, and purity, that is, aspects related to social norms 
and the moral concerns of the social group to which the 
individual belongs (Graham et al., 2011).
Although recent in comparison to the traditional view of 
moral psychology, which focuses on the central role of reason 
(Kohlberg, 1984), the new approach has gained strength 
and has been found to be in line with scientific studies in 
related areas (Adolphs, 2009; C.D. Frith, 2007; Molnar-
Szakacs, 2011). Studies in the emergent field of social 
information processing suggest that both social cognitive 
and metacognitive processes contribute to the emergence of 
culture, upon which morality is grounded (Adolphs, 2009). 
Social cognition involves the processing of social 
information, much of which occurs without the need 
of awareness (C. D. Frith & U. Frith, 2007). In turn, 
metacognition refers to the conscious monitoring of cognitive 
processes, which involves thinking about the thought, 
making it possible to reflect and justify one’s behavior to 
others (C. D. Frith, 2012) and a high-order metacognition is 
not just thinking about the thought, but about the one who is 
thinking. In this sense, it could be said that moral concerns 
are related to three specific aspects of social cognition and 
metacognition: empathy, self-consciousness, and moral 
self-concept.
Empathy is being conscious of the thoughts and feelings 
of others (Davis, 1983; Sampaio, Guimarães, Santos, 
Formiga, & Menezes, 2011) and it is triggered by the social 
observation of other people’s behavior (Leiberg & Anders, 
2006). It plays a role in both social cognition and social 
adjustment, but it also depends on the ability to self-evaluate. 
The ability to perceive, share, and understand the emotional 
state of others gives meaning to interactions and is essential 
for survival (Carrera et al., 2013; Decety & Svetlova, 2012; 
Robinson, 2008). Furthermore, empathy deficits are related 
to personality disorders such as psychopathy (Hare, 1993), 
Machiavellianism, narcissism (Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012) and 
even interpersonal deficits in autistic spectrum syndrome (aan 
het Rot & Hogenelst, 2014; Lombardo, Barnes, Wheelwright, 
& Baron-Cohen, 2007). It therefore comprises a complex, 
broad-spectrum construct that includes emotional contagion, 
feelings of concern, the experience of sharing  emotional 
experience with others, and even the ability to know 
what the other is thinking or feeling (Decety & Svetlova, 
2012; Todd & Burgmer, 2013). In this sense, empathy 
comprises socioemotional skills anchored in emotional, 
neurobiological, and cognitive subsystems that operate in 
parallel (Molnar-Szakacs, 2011; Reniers et al., 2012). Added 
to knowledge of the social world, such socioemotional skills 
added to the knowledge of the social world result in a mode 
of moral functioning that enables and compels individuals 
to produce responses to events that affect the well-being of 
others, whether near or far. Thus, mature moral functioning 
depends on the integration of emotion, intuition, and reason 
(Narvaez, 2010), which in turn means that understanding the 
emotional state of others is just as important as the activity 
of monitoring and evaluating one’s own feelings, thoughts, 
and actions.
Self-consciousness implies high-order thought and 
metacognition together with an introspective evaluation of 
one’s own feelings, thoughts, and behaviors (DaSilveira, 
DeCastro, & Gomes, 2012; Grant, Franklin, & Langford, 
2002). Monitoring one’s own actions and evaluating this 
monitoring are fundamental aspects of self-evaluation, 
which forms the basis of private self-consciousness (Silvia, 
Eichstaed, & Phillips, 2005; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). 
According to Grant et al. (2002), private self-consciousness 
may be broken divided into two sub-factors: self-reflection, 
which is associated with monitoring one’s own actions, and 
insight, which is associated with evaluating this monitoring. 
Self-consciousness entails the ability to differentiate between 
oneself and the other and includes a sense of awareness 
over one’s experiences and a first-person perspective on the 
awareness of space, environment, emotions, and memory by 
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means of a specific neural integrative mechanism (Rochat, 
2013; Webber, 2011). In this sense, the self or sense of agency 
may be defined as a self-attribution system that lies within a 
framework of social reference of shared representations (De 
Vignemont & Fourneret, 2004).
Finally, moral self-concept is a personal description 
in relation to self-evaluated moral characteristics (Stake, 
1994). In turn, self-concept is the part of the self-attribution 
system formed by self-descriptions of self-evaluative 
contents (Stake, 1994). The findings of the study by Lu and 
Chang (2011) with university students suggest that moral 
self-concept is a function of self-consciousness, and later 
studies find a significant correlation between moral behavior 
and high moral self-concept scores (Cremer & Mulder, 
2007; Young, Chakroff, & Tom, 2012). Furthermore, moral 
character is a major dimension with which one evaluates and 
is evaluated by others (Nowak, Page, & Sigmund, 2000), 
that is, it is safe and reliable for predicting potential partners 
and co-workers based on moral traits. Recent studies on the 
moral self state that moral traits are essentially what make 
a person who he or she is. Without this moral sensitivity, 
the person ceases to exist and becomes unrecognizable 
compared to who he or she used to be (Strohminger & 
Nichols, 2014). For moral self-researchers, the manner in 
which individuals monitor their suitable social standards is 
at the heart of personal identity. According to Haidt (2007), 
self-interest is followed by interest in the way one treats 
others and the groups to which one belongs. Together, these 
findings help explain the importance of moral self-concept 
to moral concerns.
In this sense, given that moral concerns are part of a 
process of intuition modulated by social cognition, the main 
objective of the present study is to explore the relationship 
between moral concerns and empathy, moral self-concept, 
and self-consciousness. Certain aspects of empathy are 
expected to be good predictors of both moral concerns 
and moral self-concept. Higher-order meta-cognitive skills 
such as self-consciousness and other factors that contribute 
to empathy factors, such as perspective-taking, are not 
expected to predict intuitive moral concerns, since high-
order metacognition involves self-reflection and cognitive 
control, while intuitive moral concerns are an automatic and 
intuitive form of social cognition. 
Method
Participants
A total of 341 adults answered the survey, the majority 
of whom were female (63%) and fell into the age groups 
21 to 28 years old (37%) or 28 to 35 years old (26%); 63% 
of participants were female. The sample encompassed 
the regions of Brazil, with a predominance of participants 
from the Southeast Region (65.9%). Inclusion criteria were 
Brazilian and aged 18 years and over. Brazilian residents 
living abroad were excluded.
Instruments
Self-Reflection and Insight Scale - SRIS. The original 
SRIS (Grant et al., 2002) was adapted and validated for use 
in Brazil by DaSilveira et al. (2012), and it is composed of 20 
items which should be evaluated using a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Two 
subfactors evaluate different dimensions of the theoretical 
construct: self-reflection (SR) is the activity of inspecting and 
evaluating thoughts, feelings, and behaviors (for example, 
“I’m very interested in examining what I think.”), and insight 
(IS) is an internal state of understanding one’s thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviors (for example, “It is important to me 
to try to understand what my feelings mean.”). This version 
exhibited satisfactory reliability, with Cronbach’s alpha = 
0.90 for self-reflection and 0.82 for insight.
Interpersonal Reactivity Index - IRI. The original IRI 
(Davis, 1983) was adapted for use in Brazil by Sampaio et 
al. (2011). The scale evaluates the cognitive and affective 
components of empathy. It consists of 4 dimensions that 
generate independent subscales measured on a 5-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally 
agree), with a total of 26 items. The cognitive dimensions of 
perspective-taking (PT) and fantasy (FS) assess, respectively, 
the ability to put oneself in the place of others, imagining 
what they think or feel (for example, “I try to understand my 
friends, imagining how they see things”) and the ability to 
put oneself in the place of film and/or book characters (for 
example, “I’m neutral when I watch films”, which is an item 
with a reverse score). The affective dimensions of empathic 
concern (EC) and personal distress (PD) assess, respectively, 
the motivation to help people for whom one feels empathy 
(for example, “I put myself in the place of others if I worry 
about them”) and the subjective feelings of discomfort or 
anxiety produced in the self when the individual is faced with 
a stressful situation or emergency (for example, “Usually I 
get nervous when I see injured people”). The translation and 
adaptation studies indicate the adequate reliability of the FS, 
EC, PD, and PT dimensions, with Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81, 
0.71, 0.76, and 0.71, respectively.
Moral Self-Concept Scale - MSCS. This is the Morality 
subscale from the Six-Factor Self-Concept Scale (SFSCS) 
(Stake, 1994), which was translated for use in the present 
study. The translation by experts of the MSCS was 
organized in 3 steps. First, a bilingual researcher translated 
the scale from English into Portuguese. Then, the translated 
version was reviewed by 2 bilingual researchers to verify 
semantic equivalence; and finally, 2 independent experts 
in moral psychology analyzed the revised version. The 
self-concept scale encompasses 6 dimensions that evaluate 
various aspects of one’s feelings and thoughts about oneself. 
Morality is one of the 6 dimensions of the self-concept 
scale and measures the individual performance of adults 
in qualities of universal value, regardless of nationality, 
religion, or ethnicity: loyal, truthful, law-abiding, faithful, 
trustworthy, and honest. The 6 items are answered on a 
7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (never true of me) to 7 
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(always true of me). In the original validation study (Stake, 
1994), the morality dimension exhibited satisfactory 
reliability among both graduate students and non-student 
adults, with Cronbach’s alpha = 0.85 and 0.64, respectively. 
In the study adapting the scale to Brazil, reliability was 
established based on Cronbach’s alpha = 0.82 in a Brazilian 
adult population.
Moral Foundations Questionnaire - MFQ. The MFQ 
(Graham et al., 2011) was adapted for Brazil using the same 
translation method applied to the Moral Self-Concept Scale, 
described previously. The instrument consists of 2 parts that 
assess moral relevance and moral judgment about moral 
concerns using a 7 point Likert scale ranging from 0 (not 
relevant/strongly disagree) to 6 (extremely relevant/strongly 
agree), with a total of 25 items. The adapted version for use 
in Brazil has 2 factors: IMC, which mostly includes items 
from the harm and fairness factors, and BMC, which includes 
items related to in group (social belonging), authority, and 
purity. The Cronbach’s alphas for the Brazilian version were 
IMC = 0.89 and CMC = 0.84.
Socio-Demographic Information Questionnaire. Additionally, 
participants were requested to answer questions regarding gender, 
age, and geographic location.
Procedure
Data collection. Participants were recruited using the 
snowball sampling method. The sample was contacted 
through a standard message sent to email addresses 
registered in the contact list of the researcher and social 
networks (for example, Facebook) following the criteria 
of nationality (Brazilian) and age (over 18 years old). 
An electronic questionnaire was built with five different 
instruments, as described previously. Instruments were 
presented in a fixed sequence as forms in 5 virtual pages 
in the order described above. Participants were allowed to 
review what they had filled out but could not move forward 
until all the items in a page were filled out. At the end of 
the questionnaire, the respondent had to click on the submit 
icon for the participation to be registered and computed for 
the study.
Data analysis. Data were analyzed using the statistical 
program Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 
for Windows, version 18.0. Descriptive and reliability 
analyses were performed. Correlations and multiple linear 
regressions were used to analyze the relationships between 
constructs. The significance level adopted was 5% with a 
95% confidence interval.
Ethical Considerations
The research followed all ethical procedures 
required by Brazilian standards for research with human 
subjects. The research project was duly approved by the 
Ethics Committee in Research with Human Subjects 
affiliated to Brazilian National System of Research Ethics 
(SISNEP), under protocol number 29690314.3.0000.5542.
Results
As observed in Table 1, the score of individualizing 
moral concerns (IMC) was positively correlated to self-
reflection (SR), moral self-concept (MC), perspective-
taking (PT), empathic concern (EC), personal distress (PD), 
fantasy (FS), and binding moral concerns (BMC). Binding 
moral concerns (BMC) showed a positive correlation with 
insight (IS), moral self-concept (MC), fantasy (FS), and 
empathic concern (EC) and a negative correlation with 
perspective-taking (PT).
Table 1
Covariance of Self-Consciousness, Moral Self-Concept, Empathy, and Moral Concerns Constructs
SR IS MC PT FS EC PD IMC BMC
Self-Consciousness
Self-Reflection (SR) -
Insight (IS) 0.23*** -
Moral Self-Concept (MC) 0.05 0.26*** -
Empathy
Perspective-Taking (PT) 0.15** -0.29*** -0.03 -
Fantasy (FS) 0.26*** 0.18*** 0.28*** 0.10 -
Empathic Concern (EC) 0.18*** -0.03 0.26*** 0.40*** 0.38*** -
Personal Distress (PD) -0.02 -0.47*** -0.04 0.50*** -0.02 0.40*** -
Moral Concerns
Individualizing Concerns (IMC) 0.13* -0.01 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.20*** 0.49*** 0.29*** -
Binding Concerns (BMC) -0.09 0.12* 0.31*** -0.15** 0.13* 0.18*** 0.03 0.30*** -
Note. ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
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IMC, three constructs explained 28.3% of the variance. 
The variables of moral self-concept (MC) (p = 0.02), 
empathic concern (EC) (p < 0.001), and personal distress 
(PD) (p = 0.0047) showed significant positive associations 
with IMC; therefore, as these three variables increase, so 
do individualizing moral concerns. The remaining variables 
were not relevant factors for individualizing moral concerns.
With regard to binding moral concerns, four variables 
explained 15.4% of its variance. Self-reflection (SR) (p = 
0.018) and perspective-taking (PT) (p < 0.001) showed a 
negative association (p < 0.05) with BMC, whereas moral 
self-concept (MC) (p < 0.001) and empathic concern (EC) (p = 
0.006) associated positively. That is, when self-reflection and 
perspective-taking increase, binding moral concerns decrease. 
By contrast, when moral self-concept and empathic concern 
increase, binding moral concerns also increase. The remaining 
variables were not relevant factors for binding moral concerns.
As expected, self-reflection (SR) significantly correlated 
with insight (IS). In addition, self-reflection (SR) showed a 
positive correlation with perspective-taking (PT), empathic 
concern (EC), and fantasy (FS). Insight (IS), in turn, showed 
a positive correlation with moral self-concept (MC) and 
fantasy (FS). By contrast, it correlated negatively with 
perspective-taking (PT) and personal distress (PD). With 
regard to moral self-concept (MC), in addition to the above 
correlations, there was a positive correlation with fantasy 
(FS) and empathic concern (EC). Perspective-taking (PT) 
positively correlated with empathic concern (EC) and 
personal distress (PD). The variable of empathic concern 
(EC) had the highest number of correlations, correlating 
positively with all variables, but insight (IS).
Individualizing moral concerns and binding moral 
concerns were included as dependent variables in multiple 
linear regression analyses (Table 2). In relation to the 
Table 2
Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting the Variables of Individualizing and Binding Moral Concerns (Method Enter)
Independent Variables
Individualizing Binding
β R2 Adjusted R2 β R2 Adjusted R2
Self-Reflection 0.04
0.28 0.27
-0.22*
0.17 0.15
Insight 0.04 0.11
Moral Self-Concept 0.14* 0.33*
Perspective-Taking 0.09 -0.28*
Fantasy 0.00 0.07
Empathic Concern 0.34* 0.27*
Personal Distress 0.09* 0.14
Note. *p < 0.05.
Discussion
This study embraced the challenge of relating the variables 
of empathy, self-consciousness, and moral self-concept in an 
investigation of moral concerns. Results showed that despite 
their high affinity, the constructs present specificities in relation 
to moral concerns. The initial expectations that some aspects of 
empathy would be good predictors of moral concerns and that 
the higher-order metacognitive skills would not be predictive 
of moral intuitions were confirmed. The importance of the 
affective aspects related to moral concerns and moral self-
concept which are positively associated with moral concerns, is 
emphasized. Higher-order metacognitive skills were negatively 
associated with binding moral concerns.
Empathic concern, moral concerns and moral self-
concept not only appear together but also vary in the same 
direction, that is, when one is high, the others are high as well. 
This result suggests the relevance of a new synthesis of moral 
psychology that focuses on affective and social processes and 
relates motivation to moral intuition and self-interest (Haidt, 
2007). And a possible explanation for this result comes 
from the theory of the moral mind (Haidt & Joseph, 2008), 
according to which moral functioning implies social-
perceptual skills that allows people to perceive morally 
relevant information from both the context and their own 
emotions and actions. For Haidt and Joseph (2008), virtues 
exemplify this kind of social-perceptual skills.
In turn, perspective-taking was the only variable to 
covariate negatively with binding moral concerns and 
insight. In the case of insight, the negative covariance 
with perspective-taking may be explained by the fact that 
although both are high-order cognitive processes, they are 
psychological phenomena of opposite natures. In perspective-
taking, the focus is on understanding the emotions of others, 
whereas in insight the focus is on understanding one’s 
own emotions. According to Leiberg and Anders (2006), 
perspective-taking is a deliberate activation process, unlike 
emotional contagion, where a process of instant activation 
of the emotional representation of others occurs. Thus, 
as a high-order cognitive process, perspective-taking 
modulates the distress caused by emotional contagion. 
Therefore, with regard to insight, it is speculated that the 
orientation of the inference process directed toward the 
self might possibly occurs through the inhibition of the 
Paidéia, 28, e2818
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perspective of the other and vice versa, which explains also 
the negative correlation with perspective-taking. Another 
distinctive quality of insight can explain its correlation 
with the variable of moral self-concept as opposed to the 
absence of correlation between the moral self-concept and 
self-reflection. Whereas self-reflection refers to the activity 
of inspecting and evaluating one’s thoughts, feelings, and 
motives (without necessarily understanding them), insight 
refers to their internal understanding (Grant et al., 2002). 
In addition, according to Trapnell and Campbell (1999), it 
is necessary to distinguish between two types of reflection: 
the type motivated by an epistemic interest in the self and 
rumination, a process driven by perceived disadvantages 
in relation to the self. Therefore, it may be suggested that 
for moral self-concept, it is more important to be able to 
reach conclusive understanding (insight) about one’s own 
thoughts, feelings, and motives than to be able to assess 
them. It would be possible to suggest that self-assessment 
without insight, therefore, becomes rumination, which 
prevents the development of moral self-concept.
As a good predictor of both individualizing and binding 
moral concerns, moral self-concept demonstrates the power 
that reputation has on the cohesion and cooperation of 
communities. This result is compatible with studies claiming 
that respect in relationships and satisfaction of the needs of 
belonging and reputation only exist when individuals have a 
positive self-concept (Cremer & Mulder, 2007). In addition, 
Silvia et al. (2005) suggest that private self-consciousness is 
more a measure of self-relevant motivation than a measure 
of self-focused attention. If these data may be extended to 
self-concept, then this phenomenon explains why high moral 
self-concept and moral behavior are significantly associated 
(Young et al., 2012).
Empathic concern as predictive of individualizing and 
binding moral concerns may be explained by the central role 
that automatic, affective psychological processes play in 
relation to moral concerns, according to the Moral Foundations 
Theory (Graham et al., 2011). This result confirms a trend noted 
by the scientific literature on the high importance of empathic 
affection for interpersonal relationships. The definition of 
empathic concern as motivation to help individuals for whom 
one feels empathy (Davis, 1983) predicts this relationship with 
pro-social attitudes, empirically confirmed by Robinson (2008). 
More recently, empathic concern has been identified as being 
able to elicit the guilt response and inhibit criminal behavior 
(Martinez, Stuewig, & Tangney, 2014). Furthermore, although 
the relationship between empathy deficits and psychopathy is 
controversial (Lishner et al., 2012), Hare (1993) presents data 
that support the existence of such a relationship. Moreover, 
aan het Rot and Hogenelst (2014) indicate that limitations 
in the capacity for empathic affect worsen the interpersonal 
deficits of autistic individuals.
It should be noted that personal distress appeared together 
with empathic concern as a good predictor of individualizing 
moral concerns; that is, the greater the distress or subjective 
sensitivity was when encountering a stressful situation 
or emergency, allied to the concern or motivation to help 
individuals for whom one feels empathy, the greater the 
individual moral concerns relative to harm and fairness. The 
data from the present study especially corroborate the findings 
of Carrera et al. (2013), who suggest that personal distress and 
empathy together comprise a dynamic emotional experience 
that is able to predict altruistic behaviors.
As expected, perspective-taking and self-reflection were 
negative predictors of binding moral concerns, which may be 
explained by the fact that moral concerns are intuitive social 
cognitions and that the presence of higher-order processes 
is able to change or even cancel out social intuition (Haidt, 
2001). For example, the recent study by Todd and Burgmer 
(2013) notes that perspective-taking is able to combat the 
automatic expression of racial prejudice, that is, to the extent 
that the self is psychologically connected to the target group, 
culturally absorbed discrimination yields to other possibilities of 
intergroup contact. Together, these findings explain the negative 
association between perspective-taking and self-reflection and 
binding moral concerns, pointing a direction for efforts that 
intend to combat this type of harmful automatic expression.
Overall, the results suggest that the affective aspects of 
empathy and moral self-concept are significantly associated with 
moral concerns, whereas cognitive aspects that require higher-
order processes do not significantly relate or negatively relate 
to moral concerns. That is, the manner in which individuals 
concern about others and about the groups to which they 
belong seems to be strongly related to the moral concept they 
have of themselves and the emotions they are able to process in 
everyday situations that involve moral issues (associated with 
affective social information processing).
The implications of these results for understanding 
moral concerns suggest empirical evidence in favor of the 
social-intuitionist moral model (Haidt, 2001). According to 
this model, moral judgments are motivated more strongly by 
social and emotional moral intuition than by conscious reason, 
as predicted by the rationalist theoretical model of morality 
(Kohlberg, 1984). However, results raised the question of 
the extent to which moral concerns, produced intuitively, 
can contribute to mature moral functioning. According to 
Narvaez (2010), metacognitive skills such as self-regulation, 
self-reflection, and locus of control are skills that need to 
be developed alongside emotions and moral intuitions for 
mature moral functioning to be possible. The results suggest 
that the use of conscious reason through self-reflection and 
perspective-taking can produce insights that are able to cancel 
out automatic assessments or socially produced intuitions 
(Haidt, 2001). That is, higher-order processes seem to play an 
important role in the evaluation and organization of knowledge 
derived from moral intuitions and in the promotion of mature 
moral functioning at the individual and broad social levels, in 
addition to enabling human moral evolution.
The study presented an up-to-date methodological strategy 
by focusing on self-reported measures in a virtual setting. 
Self-reported measures may contain limitations; however, the 
anonymity and distance from the eyes of the researchers may 
have made the answers even more reliable. In a future study, 
it would be important to correlate the variables to individual 
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characteristics that may be related to moral functioning, such as 
the number of siblings and membership in community groups.
Although this study found some (positive and 
negative) associations between the constructs, the analyses 
performed do not make it possible to make inferences with 
regard to how the constructs influence one another. Other 
methodological strategies may be necessary to understand 
how the relationships between constructs are organized. 
However, it is believed that the proposed design made it 
possible to illuminate Haidt’s moral psychology social-
intuitionist model, and concordance between theory and the 
results regarding the central role of social cognition related 
to affections in moral judgment was observed. In addition, 
it was possible to empirically analyze the understanding 
of the moral concerns of a sample of Brazilians. Given 
the importance and complexity of the phenomenon, it is 
fundamental that studies on the psychological mechanisms 
underlying moral concerns and mature moral functioning 
continue to advance with the continuity of studies on 
theorizations of human morality.
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